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“DEAD COPIES” UNDER THE JAPANESE UNFAIR COMPETITION 
PREVENTION ACT: THE NEW MORAL RIGHT 
KENNETH L. PORT* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1993, the Japanese legislature, or Diet, amended the Unfair Competition 
Prevention Act (UCPA) to prevent the slavish copying (moho) of another’s 
product configuration (shohinno keitai) regardless of registration, regardless of 
notice of any kind, regardless of whether the configuration was distinctive in 
any way, and regardless of whether any consumer was confused or deceived.1  
 
*  Professor of Law and Director of Intellectual Property Studies, William Mitchell College of 
Law.  J.D., University of Wisconsin.  I am deeply indebted to Laurie Sheen (WMCL ‘07) and 
Toshiya Kaneko (University of Tokyo) for their assistance with this article.  This article was 
researched while I was a Foreign Research Fellow at the Tokyo University Business Law Center 
under the gracious auspices of Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama. 
 1. Fuseikyoso Boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 47 of 1993, 
translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–96 (2005) [hereinafter UCPA].  In this paper, I 
refer to Article 2-1-3 of the amended UCPA as “the Dead Copy Statute.”  Although the original 
UCPA predated World War II, the original UCPA largely addressed counterfeit goods.  See 
Fuseikyoso Boshiho [Unfair Competition Prevention Act], Law No. 14 of 1934.  During the 
Occupation of Japan, General Head Quarters (GHQ) had a large influence on shaping Japanese 
unfair competition policy.  See Tetsuo Tomita, Fuseikyosoboshiho Seiteikankeishiryo [Documents 
on the Legislative Process of Unfair Competition Law], 1994/3 Patent Studies 50 (translated by 
author).  In fact, even the Preamble of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which ultimately ended 
the Occupation of Japan, noted the importance of conforming to international standards: “. . . in 
public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices.”  
Multilateral Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3.3 U.S.T. 3169, 3171 (1952). 
  Even before the San Francisco Peace Treaty but at the urging of GHQ, Japan amended 
the UCPA in significant ways.  CHIKUJO KAISETSU FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO [CLAUSE BY CLAUSE 
EXPLANATION OF THE UCPA] 5–7 (METI Intell. Prop. Policy Comm. eds., 2005) (translated by 
author).  For instance, in order to obtain an injunction, a subjective intent to engage in unfair 
competition would no longer be a requirement.  Id.  This was done because even though there 
were multiple examples of objective intent to cause unfair competition, it was impossible to prove 
that someone subjectively intended to engage in unfair competition.  Id.  Additionally, in order to 
obtain an injunction, the prior Act required that there be “an injured party.”  Id.  This was 
changed to focus on the specific and likely conduct, as well as the likely resulting harm.  Id.  
Also, “exportation” was added to each specific offense.  Id.  The amendments also made 
requirements for showing a false place of origin simpler.  Id.  The amendments made actionable 
conduct that caused people to be deceived as to a goods’ source.  Id.  Next, the amendments made 
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The Japanese refer to the concept of slavish imitation as “dead copies.”  This 
monopoly grant lasts for three years from the date the product is first sold.2 
Before 1993, product configurations were protected either under the old 
UCPA or the Civil Code.  Although there were numerous cases that 
successfully claimed rights under the old UCPA, before a configuration could 
be protected under the old law, it had to be a “well-known” appellation of a 
source.3  It was perceived that if Japan was going to improve its economic 
condition, it needed to become an “intellectual property society.”4  
 
actionable deceptive practices regarding a product’s quality, content, or volume.  Id.  The 
amendments also strengthened the right to demand a restoration of trust in the marketplace.  Id.  
Other provisions were also added.  Id. 
  Changes to the UCPA are well-documented.  See generally id. 8–17.  In 1953 the UCPA 
was amended to bring Japan in compliance with the Madrid Protocol, which prevented false or 
misleading designations of origin.  Id.  In 1965 the UCPA was amended to bring Japan in 
compliance with the Paris Convention and the Treaty of London.  Id.  In 1975 the UCPA was 
amended to make Japan compliant with the Stockholm Amendments to the Paris Convention.  Id.  
In 1990 the UCPA was amended to bring Japan into compliance with what ultimately became 
known as the TRIPs Agreement.  Id.  In the twelve years since the 1993 amendments, the UCPA 
has been amended nine times.  Id.  In context, this is not that surprising a fact; the U.S. Copyright 
statute has been amended 25 times in the last 30 years.  See JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN 
A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 36 (2006).  The common wisdom is that these changes were 
required to protect configurations that may ultimately be registered under the Design Law.  
However, in 1993 Design Law registration required three years.  It now takes roughly one year.  
Furthermore, academics as well as practitioners opine that there have not yet been major cases 
where large amounts of damages have been awarded under Article 2-1-3.  As such, it has not yet 
caught the fancy of Japanese academics or practitioners. 
 2. See infra Part V.B. 
 3. Noriichi Okaguchi, Shohinkeitaimoho [Slavish Imitation of Product Configuration], in 
CHITEKIZAISANKANKEISOSHOHO [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RELATED LITIGATION] 457 (Hon. 
Toshiaki Makino & Hon. Toshiaki Iimura, eds., 2004) (discussing protection of product 
configuration under the pre-1993 UCPA) (translated by author).  Even after 1993, some elect to 
protect product configurations using Article 2-1-1, which requires a showing that the 
configuration is an appellation of source, that the configuration is well-known, and that 
purchasers are confused.  See, e.g., Miyama Kogyo, K.K. v. Flex System, K.K., 1891 HANREI 
JIHO 147 (Tokyo D. Ct., Feb. 15, 2005) (translated by author). 
 4. This societal wide movement has even been the impetus for the creation of Centers at 
rather unlikely universities.  For example, Hiroshima University has created the “Intellectual 
Property Society Creativity Center.”  See Hiroshima University, http://home.hiroshima-
u.ac.jp/chizai/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (translated by author).  Interestingly, though, they 
translate this into English as merely the “Intellectual Property Center.”  Present Prime Minister 
Koizumi has been quoted in various contexts as seeking to create a nation “founded on 
intellectual property.”  See, e.g., Mayumi Negishi, Japan Gets Intellectual on Property Rights, 
JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ 
nb20041208a1.htm.  However, at least in the minds of the Tokyo District Court, this apparently 
has not yet been successful.  See Torada v. Shimoda, 1913 HANREI JIHO 146 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 
21, 2005) (translated by author).  In Torada, the Tokyo District Court held that the trademark IP 
FIRM was not appropriate for registration because consumers would not necessarily know what 
“IP” meant.  Id. at 153–54.  The court reasoned that IP could stand for “Internet Protocol” or 
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Accordingly, a specific statutory prohibition of slavish imitation was included 
in the amendment. 
Article 709 of the Civil Code provides yet another way to protect product 
configurations.5  Article 709 essentially makes the infringement of any general 
right a tort.6  In a pivotal case that became a true rallying point for advocates of 
the cause, the defendant slavishly imitated the plaintiff’s furniture.7  Even 
though the plaintiff prevailed and damages were awarded, the court held that 
the Civil Code did not authorize it to issue an injunction.8  Injunctions are not 
available under the general provisions of the Japanese Civil Code; monetary 
damages are the appropriate remedy.  Unless there is a specific provision 
authorizing injunctions, they are not appropriate under the Civil Code.9  Since 
most plaintiffs in dead copy cases only wanted an injunction and not damages, 
it became apparent that a large disconnect existed between what manufacturers 
wanted and what the Civil Code permitted.10 
In Japan, this protection has become known as protecting a product from 
“dead copies.” Dead copy protection in Japan goes too far.  It would be 
unconstitutional if done in the United States.11  The notion relied upon by 
Japanese drafters, that international harmonization makes this type of 
protection necessary, is simply incorrect.  No such specific corollary protection 
 
“Inkjet Printer.”  Id.  Therefore, the mark did not identify for consumers that the services come 
from a specific source.  Id. 
 5. Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709, translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. 
No. 2100–01 (2005) (stating that one who either intentionally or negligently damages the rights 
protected by law of another shall be responsible for those damages). 
 6. Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Fernandes, K.K., 1719 HANREI JIHO 122 (Tokyo High Ct., Feb. 
24, 2000) (“Making dead copies of another’s product configuration is prohibited by the Unfair 
Competition Prevention Law.  If such conduct exceeds the scope of fair competition, it will be 
adjudicated to be a tort.”) (translated by author). 
 7. Dai Nippon Printing, K.K. v. Takebayashi Mfg., K.K., 1418 HANREI JIHO 120 (Tokyo 
High Ct., Dec. 17, 1991) (translated by author). 
 8. TETSUYA WATANABE ET AL., FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO NO MINAOSHI NO HOKO [TRENDS 
IN REVISING THE UCPA] 143 (Comm. on Intell. Prop., Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
eds., 1994) (translated by author). 
 9. Zentaro Kitagawa, 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, XIII Business Liability § 1.07[2][a] 
(1996) (“Relief other than money is permissible . . . only where a special rule has so provided.”). 
 10. Similarly, in another very recent case, Yomiuri Newspaper, the court found a violation of 
Article 709 of the Civil Code and ordered damages to be paid to a major Japanese newspaper, but 
found also that an injunction is improper under the Civil Code when the defendant copied its 
headlines and provided links to the articles.  Yomirui Newspaper v. Digital Alliance (Intellectual 
Property High Court, Oct. 6, 2005) (translated by author), available at http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/ 
jp/lngateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm&vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu.  Even though a 
Dead Copy Statute violation was alleged, the court based its judgment on Article 709 of the Civil 
Code.  Id. at 11–15; see also, Minpō [Civil Code], Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709, translated in 2 
EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 2100–01 (2005).  The court did find that the articles constituted a 
“product configuration,” but did not find them slavishly imitated.  Yomiuri Newspaper, at 12. 
 11. See infra notes 33–44 and accompanying text. 
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exists in other jurisdictions and, most certainly, no international treaty requires 
protection to the extent enjoyed in Japan.  Dead copy protection, in fact, makes 
international harmonization on this point impossible because dead copy 
protection in the United States would be impossible, and goes much further 
than other Civil Law jurisdictions have gone.12 
By granting an arbitrary, monopolistic three-year window of protection 
against the copying of product configurations, the Japanese extend an 
undeserved, statutory monopoly to holders of such product configurations.  
This will ultimately chill new product development and negatively affect the 
fragile Japanese economy.  In essence, the dead copy provision of the UCPA 
strikes another blow to the public domain,13 and protects sweat of the brow, a 
justification for intellectual property that has long been considered spurious at 
best.14  In the end, the Dead Copy Statute acts like a new moral right where 
strict liability attaches. 
 
 12. See infra notes 45–50. 
 13. The discussion in the United States about the balance between intellectual property 
protection, on one hand, versus the protection of the public domain, on the other, is rich and 
fascinating.  See, e.g., Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property Paradigm and 
Trademark Incontestability, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 303 (2000); Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors 
and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.  J.L. & 
ARTS 1, 5–34 (1994); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 
(1999); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1331 (2004); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, International Intellectual 
Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 431 (2004); Jane C. 
Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademark Law, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 263 (2004); Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 
WIS. L. REV. 429 (1986); Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints 
on the Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 
55 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE  L.J. 
1783 (2002); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Christine Nickles, 
The Conflicts Between Intellectual Property Protections when a Character Enters the Public 
Domain, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 133 (1999); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public 
Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002); Samuel Oddi, The Tragicomedy of the Public 
Domain in Intellectual Property Law, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2003); Simone A. 
Rose, Will Atlas Shrug? Dilution Protection for “Famous” Trademarks: Anti Competitive 
“Monopoly” or Earned “Property” Right?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 653 (1995); Kurt M. Saunders, A 
Crusade in the Public Domain: The Dastar Decision, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 161 
(2004); Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1999); 
Margaret Ann Wilkinson, National Treatment, National Interest and the Public Domain, 1 U. 
OTTOWA L. & TECH. J. 23 (2003); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the 
Construction of the Public Domain (2003), http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/boyle.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2006).  All of these authors find the expansion of intellectual property rights 
troublesome because of their interference with the public domain.  To summarize all of these 
articles, a rich and free public domain may be better for a growing economy than an economy 
with distinct monopolies carved out. 
 14. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] “DEAD COPIES” 97 
I.  THE STATUTE 
The statute itself is quite simple and straightforward.  The current version 
of Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA states that: 
Selling, distributing, exporting or importing goods which imitate the product 
configuration of another (excluding functional configurations) [shall constitute 
an act of unfair competition].15 
Article 19-1-5 of the UCPA places a three-year restriction on the assertion 
of the dead copy right calculated from the date of first sale of the good in 
Japan.16  That is, the statute contemplates prohibiting another from using a 
product configuration for a period of three years.  This three-year period is, 
essentially, a head start that the first user of a product configuration receives as 
a statutory gift. 
Although the Japanese Diet elected to use banal, generic terms that do not 
provide much direction at all, the 2005 amendments to the UCPA codified 
definitions of both “product configuration” (shohinnokeitai) and “imitation” 
(moho) as follows: 
The term “product configuration” in this Act shall mean the shape of a good or 
the shape of the good combined with the design, color, luster or mass, the 
distinctiveness of which is perceptible by a consumer through normal use.17 
The term “imitation” in this Act shall mean creating a product configuration 
which depends upon and is essentially identical to that configuration.18 
For the first time, functional configurations are expressly excluded from 
protection.  However, functionality has been defined using competitive need 
utilitarianism instead of normative functionality.19  There is still no 
requirement that the product configuration be well-known or famous,20 and no 
requirement that any third party had prior notice of this claim whatsoever. 
 
 15. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, amended by Law No. 87 of 2005, art. 2-1-3 (translated by 
author). 
 16. Id.  The statute actually reads “nihon kokunai ni oite,” which means “within Japan.”  Id.  
(translated by author).  That is, it appears to mean that one could make substantial sales of a 
configuration outside of Japan and only the importation of the article into Japan would start the 
clock running on the Dead Copy Statute.  However, this is ameliorated slightly by the definition 
of “keitai” (offering the configuration for sale, not only actual sales of the configuration, amounts 
to the use of configuration for purposes of the UCPA).  See infra Part V.A. 
 17. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 2-15-4, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 
6895–96 (2005). 
 18. Id. art. 2-15-5. 
 19. See infra notes 138–42 and accompanying text. 
 20. Appellations of source must be well recognized for protection under Article 2-1-1 of the 
UCPA and famous for protection under Article 2-1-2 of the UCPA.  See Kenneth L. Port, 
Japanese Trademark Dilution, 4 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 228, 234 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v4/n2/5.  Article 2-1-3 makes no mention of the 
distinctive capacity of the product configuration. 
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As such, this statutory endowment operates very much like a patent 
without an application process or notice to third parties.  For example, in the 
Bears Club Case,21 the Osaka District Court found a towel set consisting of a 
stuffed teddy bear, a towel holder, and towels, bundled together in a cute 
package to be a valid product configuration.22  The court found that a nearly 
identical copy of the towel set infringed the Dead Copy Statute even though 
the plaintiff had not established any distinctiveness in the configuration, even 
though the defendant had no specific notice of the claim, even though the 
plaintiff had made no registration regarding the claimed configuration, and 
even though no consumer was shown to be confused by the configuration.23 
 
 Plaintiff’s Configuration Defendant’s Configuration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.  AMERICAN LAW 
Some commentators in Japan imply that this same type of dead copy 
protection is available in the United States under a “misappropriation” theory 
of the common law.24  It is understood in the following terms in Japan: 
Under the Common Law, there is the tort of misappropriation.  To establish 
this cause of action one generally needs to show the following: 1) the plaintiff 
produced the thing appropriated expending much effort and money over a long 
period of time; 2) the defendant used the thing appropriated at little or no cost, 
 
 21. Matsui Corporation, K.K. v. Shaday, K.K., 1659 HANREI JIHO 105 (Osaka D. Ct., June 
18, 1998), translated in Kenneth L. Port, Japanese Intellectual Property Law in Translation: 
Representative Cases and Commentary, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 847, 869–75 (2001). 
 22. Id. at 873. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8, at 144. 
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such that one might characterize it as “reaping where you did not sow”; and 3) 
the plaintiff was financially damaged by the defendant’s conduct.25 
Although this accurately states the cause of action under the Common 
Law,26 it is misleading.  To be sure, there are several United States cases that 
follow this theory of misappropriation and find the defendant liable;27 
however, these cases are all “information” cases, not “product configuration” 
cases.28  The Japanese have extended a legal theory that, in the United States, 
 
 25. Id.  Interestingly enough, J. Thomas McCarthy says the following regarding the elements 
of misappropriation: 
(1) the plaintiff has made a substantial investment of time, effort, and money in creating 
the thing misappropriated, such that the court can characterize that “thing” as a kind of 
property right; (2) the defendant has appropriated the “thing” at little or no cost, such that 
the court can characterize the defendant’s actions as “reaping where it has not sown”; and 
(3) the defendant’s acts have injured the plaintiff, such as by direct diversion of profits 
from the plaintiff to the defendant or a loss of royalties that the plaintiff charges to others 
to use the thing misappropriated. 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 273 
(2d ed.1995). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (stating that “hot 
news” is protected for a limited time); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. 
Supp 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (finding that defendant’s unauthorized play-by-play broadcasts of 
baseball games constituted unfair competition with plaintiffs and were in violation of the 
Communications Act of 1934).  But c.f., NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(declining to follow Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press and finding that the play-by-play 
rebroadcasts of plaintiff’s games were not “hot news”). 
 28. Thorough discussion of the American law of product configuration is beyond the scope 
of this article.  Generally speaking, there are three forms of trade dress: product packaging, 
product configuration and a “tertium quid.”  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 
205 (2000).  According to Wal-Mart, product configuration is only protected if it has secondary 
meaning—that is, some ability to identify source in the minds of the relevant consumers.  Id. at 
215.  Secondary meaning is not required under the Japanese Dead Copy Statute.  For more on 
product configuration protection in the United States and all that it entails, see Margreth Barrett, 
Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrafFix on the Way 
to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 136 (2004) (“TrafFix indicates that the policy 
considerations enunciated in [Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats] should shape Lanham Act 
protection for product features.”); Thomas F. Cotter, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?: 
Resolving an Ostensible Conflict Between Patent Law and Federal Trademark Law, 3 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 25 (1999); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Management and Protection of Brand 
Equity in Product Configurations, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 59 (1998); Paul Heald, The Worst 
Intellectual Property Opinion Ever Written: Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co.: 
Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 415 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of 
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1697 (1999) (stating that “doctrinal creep” is resulting in 
the propertization of trademarks which will result in additional transaction costs to society); 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999); Stephen K. Marsh, 
Patents are Forever: Construing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to Apply to Product 
Configurations in Sunbeam Products, Inc v. The West Bend Co., 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 421 
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is primarily used to prohibit the use of someone else’s “information” (which 
may take different forms)29 and to prohibit slavishly copying someone’s 
product configuration.30  Furthermore, the common law notion of 
misappropriation requires that the plaintiff be financially damaged.31  There is 
no such express requirement in the Dead Copy Statute. 
Therefore, the Dead Copy Statute goes too far.  To rely on American 
misappropriation theory to justify it is just wrong.  To imply that Japan’s Dead 
Copy Statute can rely, in any way, on the Common Law for its justification is a 
gross overstatement. 
Additionally, the Dead Copy Statute would be unconstitutional if enacted 
in the United States; therefore, any harmonization is impossible.  The UCPA 
provision fails to provide for notice of any claims arising thereunder, would 
likely be void for vagueness, and would obviously be preempted by the Patent 
Act and Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution (the so-
called Patent and Copyright Clause).32 
To be constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, statutes must provide sufficient notice of 
claims that may arise thereunder.33  Product configuration claims in the United 
 
(1997); Willajeane F. McLean, Opening Another Can of Worms: Protecting Product 
Configuration as Trade Dress, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 119 (1997); Gary Myers, Statutory 
Interpretation, Property Rights, and Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in 
Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress, and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 241 (2000); David W. Opderbeck, An Economic Perspective on Product Configuration 
Trade Dress, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 327, 363 (2000) (“Product configuration trade dress can 
provide the same economic benefits as traditional trademarks.”); Judith Beth Prowda, The 
Trouble with Trade Dress Protection of Product Design, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1309 (1998); Lars 
Smith, Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia’s Tertium Quid Trade Dress Conundrum, 2005 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 243 (2005); Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s 
Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243 (2004); David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and 
Patent—The Dilemma of Confusion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 289 (1999). 
 29. Rex Y. Fujichaku, The Misappropriation Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting the 
Commercial Value of “Hot News” Information, 20 HAW. L. REV. 421, 425 (1998) (arguing that 
the common law of misappropriation of databases should be allowed to “wither away”). 
 30. See UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–96 
(2005). 
 31. MCCARTHY, supra note 25, at 273. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see, e.g., Barrett, supra note 28; Amy B. Berge, Trade 
Dress Protection: What’s Left for the States?, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 1055 (2000);. Margaret Chon, 
Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 
(1993); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are there Limits on the 
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2004); William Patry, 
The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional 
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1999); Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of 
the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307 (2005). 
 33. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (stating that the essence of the Due 
Process requirement is that a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given the opportunity to be 
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States meet this notice requirement if the configuration has secondary 
meaning.34  Under the UCPA provision, distinctiveness and secondary 
meaning are not required.  As such, a third party will not have any notice of a 
plaintiff’s claim to a configuration and the provision would lack constitutional 
justification under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. 
The UCPA provision would also be void for vagueness if enacted in the 
United States.  In Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,35 the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a statute will be void if “it fails to afford a ‘person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so 
that he [or she] may act accordingly.’”36  Vagueness and notice are related 
because if the ordinary person is not able to determine what the statute states, 
then notice is lacking.  In Roth v. U.S.,37 the Supreme Court stated that the 
language must be clear enough to sufficiently and definitely warn of the 
“proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and 
practices.”38 
The UCPA provision does not warn of the proscribed conduct when 
measured by a common understanding of trade practices because no one knows 
which configurations fall under its vast web.  This may be ameliorated 
somewhat by the fact that the defendant must be shown to have both 
subjectively and objectively intended to imitate.39  However, the UCPA 
provision would also be inconsistent with the policy behind the Patent Act40 
and the Patent and Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution.41  This 
 
heard); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (explaining 
that a fundamental requirement of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause is that all statutes 
must give notice; notice is to be calculated on the situation of the case and in such a way that it 
“reasonably conveys” all the information necessary to allow all interested parties the opportunity 
to participate). 
 34. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (holding that product 
configurations must have secondary meaning to be protected).  Secondary meaning is created in a 
mark through use in commerce where consumers come to think of it as an appellation of source 
instead of the primary meaning of the term.  Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, 
Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1085 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 35. Bama Tomato Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 112 F.3d 1542 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 36. Id. at 1547 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)). 
 37. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 38. Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1947)). 
 39. See infra Part V.C. 
 40. Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (as amended and codified at 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 
(2000)); See, e.g., King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting 
that the policy behind the Patent Act is to create incentives for innovation); Hilton Davis Chem. 
Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The patent law is directed to 
the public purposes of fostering technological progress, investment in research and development, 
capital formation, entrepreneurship, innovation, national strength, and international 
competitiveness.”) (Newman, J., concurring). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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point was perfectly and succinctly summarized by the United States Supreme 
Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. as follows: 
The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once a copyright has 
expired, like “the right to make [an article whose patent has expired]—
including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—
passes to the public.”  The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a 
“carefully crafted bargain,” under which, once the patent or copyright 
monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and 
without attribution.  Thus, in construing the Lanham Act, we have been 
“careful to caution against misuse or over-extension” of trademark and related 
protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.  “The 
Lanham Act,” we have said, “does not exist to reward manufacturers for their 
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law 
and its period of exclusivity.”  Federal trademark law “has no necessary 
relation to invention or discovery,” but rather, by preventing competitors from 
copying “a source-identifying mark,” “reduces the customer’s costs of 
shopping and making purchasing decisions,” and “helps assure a producer that 
it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related 
rewards associated with a desirable product.”42 
It is difficult to find a clearer statement of United States policy on the idea 
of slavish imitation.  In short, if the copyright and the patent have expired (or a 
patent or copyright was never obtained), there is no right to prevent a third 
party from slavishly imitating a configuration which has no source-denoting 
capacity.  That is, in the United States, unless a configuration is the subject of a 
patent, if secondary meaning is lacking, it is dedicated to the public and anyone 
can use it for any purpose.43  As such, it is hard to understand what United 
States law Japan is pretending to “harmonize” when a Dead Copy Statute is 
adopted under the pretext of “harmonization.”44 
 
 42. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (citations 
omitted). 
 43. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (“Thus the 
plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his 
wares which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling.  
The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest 
detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.”). 
 44. Although Japanese commentators do not recognize this, one potential justification from 
American law could have been the Semi-Conductor Chip Protection Act of 1984.  17 U.S.C. § 
901–14 (2000).  In essence, this law prohibits the slavish imitation of another’s chip.  In 1998, the 
United States Congress also passed the Vessel Hull Act.  17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–32 (Supp. IV 1999).  
This act, too, essentially protects boat hulls from being slavishly imitated.  The Japanese literature 
is silent on the relevance of these two developments, and it is a rare United States scholar who 
believes this is any indication of a “trend” in the protection of “market entry industrial designs.”  
See William T. Fryer, III, The Evolution of Market Entry Industrial Design Protection: An 
International Comparative Analysis, 21 EURO. INTELL. PROP. REV. 618, 618–23 (1999).  On the 
other hand, the United States Congress seems prepared to continue this expansion as the Senate 
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III.  GERMAN LAW 
The claim that Germany has a perfectly analogous cause of action to the 
Dead Copy Statute is also misleading.45  Although it is true that Civil Law 
jurisdictions generally are more sympathetic to the notion of protecting against 
imitations without a showing of confusion,46  “‘slavish imitation’ (sklavische 
Nachahmung) require[s] there to be confusion as to origin in one way or 
another.”47 
In Germany, imitations of another’s product that result in confusion are 
prohibited (Herkunftstauschung); however, under such a theory, such use of a 
product configuration must actually cause confusion and be recognized by the 
public48—two significant elements that are lacking in Japan’s Dead Copy 
theory.  Under this German theory, technical innovations have been protected 
when it is proven that they are capable of indicating origin.49 
The author of the only English study I could locate concludes as follows: 
German jurisdiction stresses that . . . direct adoption is not unlawful per se, but 
only in certain cases because of the “special features” of the product, if 
imitation is very easy (especially by electronic means, and also for databases), 
when otherwise incentives for development would be stifled or when imitation 
was undertaken systematically and for a whole range of goods.50 
This does not sound much like the Japanese Dead Copy statutory monopoly at 
all. 
Therefore, just as the reliance on the United States common law tort of 
misappropriation, reliance on German law as justification for the Dead Copy 
provision of the UCPA is simply unfounded. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The Paris Convention was enacted in 1883 and has since provided the 
basis for most international laws regarding industrial property.51  From its 
inception, it has been the lynchpin of international industrial property (patents 
and trademarks). 
Therefore, it is of some note that, at least in the United Kingdom, the Paris 
Convention has been held to not require trade dress protection for product 
 
has recently passed a bill that makes it clear that either the hull or the deck of a boat is subject to 
its provisions.  S. 1785, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 45. See, e.g., WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8, at 143. 
 46. Christopher Heath, The System of Unfair Competition Prevention in Japan 121 (2001). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 122. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, arts. 2(1), 3, Mar. 20, 1883, 
13 U.S.T. 25. 
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designs.52  In Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Products, Ltd., 
the court held that the Paris Convention did not require trade dress protection 
for product designs in Article 6bis. because the drafters of the Paris 
Convention could not have been thinking about product configuration when it 
drafted 6bis.53  Another potential international source, and one referred to in 
Japanese literature on the subject,54 is the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s so-called “Model Laws.”55  These laws are drafted from time to 
time to encourage harmonization.  However, it is pertinent to note that the 
Model Laws apparently relied upon by the Japanese do not actually contain 
any provision regarding “slavish imitation.”  The Commentary to the 1996 
Model Law on unfair competition reads as follows: 
The Model Provisions do not contain a specific provision against so-called 
“slavish imitation” because, at least for the time being, it has not been possible 
to establish generally accepted conditions for such protection that would justify 
introducing it in addition to protection by patent law.56 
That is, it was impossible for Japan to have accurately relied upon WIPO 
Model Laws three years before it was declared that, to date, no agreement 
could be reached by the member states regarding the level of protection, 
independent of patent law, that product configurations should enjoy.  Although 
the Japanese apparently relied upon these Model Laws when enacting their 
Dead Copy Statute, nothing in the Model Laws required or implied that 
countries give product configuration this level of protection. 
Although it did not exist in 1993, and therefore cannot be said to have had 
any impact on the development of Japanese law, the European Union currently 
does have a rather expansive system by which claimants of product 
configuration might enjoy some protection.  Although not binding on Japan in 
any way because Japan is, obviously, not (yet) a member of the European 
Union, the EU Design Regulation provides for the protection of product 
configuration in two ways.57  First, if the configuration claimant registers the 
design with the Office for Harmonization of the Internal Market (OHIM) in 
 
 52. Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Prods., Ltd., 1998 R.P.C. 283 (Eng. 
Ch.). 
 53. Id. 
 54. WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8. 
 55. Paul Salmon, Cooperation Between the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 429, 431 
(2003). 
 56. MODEL PROVISIONS ON PROTECTION OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 14 (World Intell. Prop. 
Org. eds. 1996), reprinted 1997 (WIPO Publication 832(E)). 
 57. Council Regulation 6/2002 on Community Designs, 2002 O.J. (L3) 1 [hereinafter EU 
Design Regulation]. “Design” is defined as the “appearance of the whole or a part of a product 
resulting from the features of, in particular, the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture and/or 
materials of the product itself and/or its ornamentation.” Id. art. 3. 
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Alicante, Spain, the protection lasts for twenty-five years.58  A second 
possibility, and one that sounds quite familiar, is that a configuration claimant 
who does not register the design can obtain three years of protection from the 
date of first sale of the product in the EU.59  The right for unregistered designs 
came into effect on March 6, 2002.60 
However, there is at least one significant difference between the EU 
scheme and the scheme in Japan.  Under the EU regime, designs are protected 
only if they are new and have an “individual character.”  This means that the 
overall impression of the design on the informed user must create a different 
impression than any prior design.61  There is no such similar requirement under 
the Japanese regime.  As such, it makes any analogy to the Japanese situation 
obsequious. 
Therefore, despite the persistent Japanese insistence that international law 
requires or encourages the Dead Copy Statute level of protection from slavish 
imitation, in fact, there are no actual mandatory requirements that Japan must 
pass and maintain the Dead Copy Statute.  Today, the EU has adopted a system 
of protecting designs that is analogous to Japan’s Dead Copy Statute, but it 
differs significantly in the way the protected configurations are defined. 
V.  JAPANESE LAW ON “DEAD COPIES” 
The Japanese Dead Copy Statute is intended to provide the first 
manufacturer a good lead time in the market place.62  The rationale is that there 
should be a reward for expending the time, money, and effort necessary to 
bring a unique product to market.  It should not just be dedicated to the public 
domain upon its initial sale.  Some view this as gap filler because it takes up to 
a year in order to obtain a registration under the Design Law.  During 
pendency of the Design Law application, sales can be freely made without 
concern of imitation.63 
In the Japanese cause of action, there are essentially six elements.  These 
elements are: 1) the good is a prescribed product configuration (shohin no 
keitai); 2) protection lasts for three years from the date of first sale; 3) the 
configuration was imitated (moho) as defined in the statute; 4) the 
 
 58. Id. art. 12. 
 59. Id. art. 11; see also, Dana Beldiman, Protecting the Form But Not the Function: Is U.S. 
Law Ready for a New Model?, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 529, 570 (2004). 
 60. John Richards, European Design Regime (2003), http://www.ladas.com/Patents/ 
PatentPractice/EUDesignRegulation/EUDesignRegime01.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 61. Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26033.htm; Okaguchi, supra note 3, at 457. 
 62. See Jerry Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994). 
 63. YOSHIYUKI TAMURA, FUSEIKYOSOHO GAISETSU (UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW) 322–24 
(2d ed. 2003) (translated by author). 
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configuration is something that is commonly used with such goods; 5) the 
configuration can be considered a “good” (shohin); and 6) the configuration 
imitated is that of another person. 64  The configuration would be protected if 
the imitation damaged the original user’s business or was likely to damage that 
business.65 
There is very little debate about the normative value of Dead Copy 
protection, and the lack of a normative debate is odd given that Japan is rapidly 
becoming an “intellectual property society.”66  That is, there is very little 
debate about where the outer edge of intellectual property should lie.  There is 
almost no debate about the significance to the society or the economy.67 
The first articulated objection to the Dead Copy Statute postulates that 
sometimes courts require something more than mere slavish imitation.68  
Sometimes courts require parties to show that there was specific intent to 
engage in unfair competition.69  This is exemplified in a situation where the 
copier is able to sell at substantially lower prices than the imitated plaintiff.  By 
avoiding the cost of conceptualizing and developing the configuration, the 
copier saves a substantial amount of time and money.  In such a case, simply 
empowering the plaintiff to enjoin the copier who, by way of his conduct, 
destroys the incentive that the plaintiff originally possessed to be the first on 
the market.  In such circumstances, an injunction ought to be sufficient to 
prevent and deter infringements.70 
However, this issue dances around the underlying problem without 
properly identifying it.  Low cost products should be rewarded.  Artificial, 
statutorily supported monopolies drive consumer costs up.  As such, Japanese 
consumers pay more for protected product configurations than, for example, 
Americans who do not have to pay for protected configurations.71  Protecting 
owners of configuration to this extent chills innovation by enabling owners to 
rely, for three years, on a once successful product configuration that someone 
 
 64. Okaguchi, supra note 3, at 457, 469. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 67. What does exist is rather superficial.  See, e.g., WATANABE ET AL., supra note 8, at 138–
39.  Although preventing all copying forever would harm the incentive to innovate, using 
someone’s product configuration when they made no investment in its development either in 
time, money, or thought should be considered “unfair.”  As such, the Dead Copy Statute creates 
the appropriate balance between these two needs of society. 
 68. See TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (“Thus the 
plaintiff has the right not to lose his customers through false representations that those are his 
wares which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling.  
The defendant, on the other hand, may copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest 
detail; but he may not represent himself as the plaintiff in their sale.”). 
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wanted to buy or copy.  However, this basic inquiry remains conspicuously 
absent from Japanese literature. 
The next issue postulates that actual, specific, head-to-head competition in 
the marketplace is not a technical requirement for protection under the Dead 
Copy Statute.72  If competition were a requirement and one put a configuration 
into the stream of commerce in Osaka, slavishly copying it in Tokyo would not 
be actionable.  Additionally, designing a licensing scheme that would account 
for all of this would be extremely difficult.  If party A started selling a 
configuration in Tokyo, and party B started selling it in Osaka, who would 
have the rights to it in Fukuoka?  To be workable, the rights contemplated 
under the Dead Copy Statute must be nationwide in scope, and clearly 
nationwide protection is too broad. 
The final concern is that services are not protected under the Dead Copy 
Statute.  This gap in protection can lead to some bizarre results.  For example, 
should someone copy the configuration of dishes used at a restaurant or 
costumes worn by the service staff, which otherwise satisfy the Dead Copy 
Statute, relief might be had under the Statute.  But if someone slavishly 
imitates the service that very same restaurant is offering, no relief can be had.  
This is because product configuration, by definition, can never be a service.73 
If the purpose of the law is to provide an incentive to innovation, what 
possibly could be the difference between services and product configuration? 
A. “Keitai” 
I translate keitai as “configuration.”  This term is commonly translated as 
“form”74 or “shape.”75  One way or the other, keitai as used in Article 2-1-3 of 
the UCPA is defined as something far broader than either term found in any 
Japanese dictionary.  Keitai in the Dead Copy Statute includes not only an 
item’s actual shape, but also its design, coloration, mass, and luster.76  That is, 
keitai refers to a good’s overall external appearance, not just its shape.77 
 
 72. TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301 (translated by author). 
 73. Id. at 303 n.1. 
 74. THE GREAT JAPANESE DICTIONARY 654 (Tadao Umesao, et al. eds., 1989) (translated by 
author). 
 75. KENKYUSHA’S NEW POCKET JAPANESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 520 (1964).  This 
translation is the common, non-legal translation. 
 76. TSUNEYUKI YAMAMOTO, YOSETSU FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO [OUTLINE OF THE UNFAIR 
COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 136 (2002) (translated by author); see SHIGEIHIKO KANEI ET 
AL., FUSEIKYOSOBOSHIHO KOMENTARU [UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION LAW AND 
COMMENTARY] 61 (2004) (translated by author). 
 77. KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 61; see also K.K. Milane-Tomoda v. Lovely Queen, 
K.K. (Intellectual Property High Court, Dec. 15, 2005) (a product configuration includes not only 
the external appearance of a good, but also includes the configuration necessary for the 
dismantling and reshaping a good), available at http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/jp/lngateway.dll?f= 
templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm&vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu; MINORU TAKEDA, 
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The Wire Brush Set Case78 was one of several cases which provided the 
language for the change in the Dead Copy Statute in the 2005 Amendments.  In 
that case, the Osaka District Court determined that “product configuration” 
includes a good’s shape, design, color, luster, and overall external 
appearance.79  The court also found that, in addition to the actual shape and 
design of the brush itself, the packaging of a hair brush set should be included 
in the definition of product configuration.80 
Both three-dimensional and two-dimensional product configuration are 
included in this definition.81  The configuration need not give the claimant any 
specific economic advantage.82  The key is that effort must have been 
expended in the form of time, labor, or money in the creation of the 
configuration.83 
The only real restriction on the concept of “keitai” (configuration) is that it 
cannot amount to the idea or concept of a configuration, only the physically 
manifested configuration itself.84  Simply stated, the claimant must establish 
that it is protecting the manifestation of the configuration, not the idea of the 
configuration.  This, at least, provides some restriction to the dead copy right.  
As we will see below, this is not the only place where the dead copy right 
sounds, looks, and feels like a copyright. 
The Japanese government has created many “councils” to advise the Diet 
on particular matters.  The “Industrial Structure Council” (sangyokozo 
shingikai) is one such council with a committee on intellectual property policy 
(chitekizaisan seisakubuka) that has studied the matter rather closely and 
reports as follows: 
 
CHITEKIZAISANKEN SHINGAIYORON [INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS] 43 
(2003) (translated by author). 
 78. Basheen, K.K. v. Eko Metal, K.K., 1826 HANREI JIHO 132 (Osaka D. Ct., Apr. 9, 2002) 
(translated by author). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  However, there is some academic debate as to whether packaging (hoso) alone 
should be separately protected.  The preponderance of opinion is that when the packaging is not 
an integral portion of the overall configuration of the product, it should not be protected.  See 
TAMURA, supra note 63, at 298; see also J. T. Hockins, Ltd. v. Osaka Chem. Indus., K.K., 28 
MUTAIZAISAN HANREISHU 140 (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 29, 1996) (translated by author) (holding that 
product configuration includes the shape, design, and color of a product, but not the container or 
product explanation brochures attached to the goods, in this case sandals). 
 81. See KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 62. 
 82. TAMURA, supra note 63, at 298 (translated by author). 
 83. Id.  This is yet another significant difference from either the common law tort of 
misappropriation or the German notion of fair competition. 
 84. K.K. Sunlemon v. K.K. Oike, 1610 HANREI JIHO 112 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 27, 1997) 
(translated by author) (“‘Product Configuration’ as contemplated under Article 2-1-3 of the 
UCPA refers to the physical manifestation of a product.  It does not include the idea or concept 
behind the product.”); TAMURA, supra note 63, at 298. 
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The creation of new things based on the fruit of a firstcomer’s efforts is 
generally conducive to a socially healthy and long-lasting growth.  Preventing 
imitation is inconsistent with freedom of competition and economic growth.  
On the other hand, allowing all copying defeats the incentives of the 
firstcomer.  Balancing the incentives provided to the firstcomer to create 
socially healthy and long-lasting growth and prevent imitations is to be 
determined based on the prevailing social and economic conditions. From this 
point of view, in the form of attaching intellectual property rights to specific 
objects, standardized restrictions are fixed in response to copying.  From the 
point of view of identifying specific acts of unfair competition, the Unfair 
Competition Prevention Act provides for a civil system (injunctions and 
damages).  Through this system, fair competition is maintained.  Recently, 
because copying has become so much easier and the life cycle of products has 
become increasingly shorter, the merit of being on the market first with any 
given product has been reduced and the competition between firstcomers and 
imitators has become intense.  As such, the will to develop individual products 
and exploit markets has been hindered.  If this situation is neglected, the 
competitive conditions will collapse.  As such, there is a need to place “dead 
copies” into the [scheme of intellectual property protection].85 
That is, this right to prevent dead copies appears to be very similar to the 
right to “hot news” as set down in International News Service v. Associated 
Press86 some ninety years ago, but never again really followed to the fullest 
extent envisioned there.87  That is, through the definition of “keitai,” the 
Japanese Diet has managed to make product configuration, whether three 
dimensional or two, whether the color, shape, or even luster of the object, “hot 
news” as contemplated in International News Service v. Associated Press.  In 
the name of harmonization, the Japanese protect the very same “sweat of the 
 
 85. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 111 (quoting SANGYO KOZO SHINGIKAI CHITEKI ZAISAN 
SEISAKU BUKAI HOKOKUSHO [REPORT OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY COMMITTEE 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL] 115 (1992)) (translated by author). 
 86. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 87. In fact, in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), Judge Learned 
Hand, in private communications with the other judges on that panel, had the following to say 
about the “hot news” doctrine: 
I confess that the Associated Press Case is somewhat of a stumbling block, but I do not 
believe that the five justices who united in Pitney, J.’s opinion meant to lay down a 
general rule that a man is entitled to “property” in the form of whatever he makes with his 
labor and money, so as to prevent others from copying it.  To do so would be to short-
circuit the Patent Office and throw upon courts the winnowing out of all such designs that 
might be presented.  While I agree that on principle it is hard to distinguish, and that the 
language applies, I cannot suppose that any principle of such far-reaching consequence 
was intended.  It will make patent cases an exception; it will give to State courts 
jurisdiction over inventions; it will overthrow the practice of centuries. 
Kenneth L. Port, Learned Hand’s Trademark Jurisprudence: Legal Positivism and the Myth of 
the Prophet, 27 PAC. L. J. 221, 238 (1996). 
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brow” that has long been discounted as justification for intellectual property 
protection in the United States.88  The intellectual property committee of the 
Industrial Structure Council was clearly aware of International News Service v. 
Associated Press, but it is not clear that the Council was aware of the 
subsequent ninety years of American jurisprudence on the topic of slavish 
copying.89  
B. Three Years Priority 
The term of protection is three calendar years to the day from the date of 
first sale (saishoni hanbai saretahi).90  Therefore, if a good is “first sold” on 
December 3, 1995, the term of protection would be through December 2, 
1998.91  Three years was determined to be the appropriate amount of time 
because the Design Law allows for six years of protection, and it was 
perceived that any such Dead Copy Protection should be shorter than the 
shortest existing intellectual property protection.92  The Japanese Government 
commissioned a survey of the Japanese Design Protection Association to study 
the life cycle of designs in Japan.93  According to the results of this survey, the 
life cycle of most designs in Japan is under three years,94 and so three years 
became the magic number.95 
The date of first sale is interpreted very broadly.  Therefore, sale in Japan 
or abroad constitutes a “sale” (hanbai),96 and the sale of just one article 
constitutes a sale for purposes of this statute.97  The statute does not 
differentiate or discriminate against non-Japanese.  In fact, even the shipping 
 
 88. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991). 
 89. It is axiomatic in United States jurisprudence that so long as a configuration is not 
subject to patent protection and does not identify source, it may be copied without restraint.  “Our 
natural inclination to disapprove of such conduct must give way to the public policy favoring 
competition, even by slavish copying . . . .”  Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 
824 (3rd Cir. 1981); see also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 
1995); Second Earth Enter. Inc. v. Allstar Prod. Mktg. Co., 717 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1989); 
Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 622 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1985); U.S. Golf Ass’n 
v. St. Andrews Sys., 219 U.S.P.Q. 143 (D.N.J. 1982). 
 90. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 19-5, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005). 
 91. This manner of calculation is dictated by Articles 138 and 143 of the Japanese Civil 
Code. 
 92. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 120. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See generally TAMURA, supra note 63, at 310–13. 
 96. CHIKUJO KAISETSU FUSEIKYOSOBHOSHIHO [CLAUSE BY CLAUSE EXPLANATION OF THE 
UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION ACT] 53 (2005). 
 97. Id. at 54 n.42; see also [Parties Not Provided], 181 HANREI TIMES 83 (Osaka High Ct., 
Oct. 31, 1962) (holding that even one sale of pyrometer constituted a “sale” for purposes of the 
Unfair Competition Prevention Act; this case predated the Dead Copy Statute). 
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of samples would start the clock running under the theory that this is the first 
date anyone could confirm the specific nature of the configuration—the date 
the public would be exposed to the configuration.98  Likewise, the publication 
of brochures or other pamphlets where specific products were offered for sale 
would also amount to the “date of first sale,” even though no money 
exchanged hands.99  The key to calculating the first sale date is to determine 
when the plaintiff has commercialized (shohinka) the good.  This 
commercialization may take many different forms.100 
For example, as a container for a rose-shaped chocolate for Valentine’s 
Day, one company manufactured and sold a heart-shaped cup.101  A company, 
Nagoya Match, K.K., ordered some 315,000 cups.102  The court held that this 
order, placed with specific knowledge of what the product looked like, 
commenced the running of the three-year period.103  In this case, the 
defendant’s use of a very similar cup commenced within three years of the 
literal sales of goods, but more than three years after this first order was 
placed.104  Accordingly, the court held that the three-year period had tolled and 
denied the claim for an injunction.105 
Similarly, if alterations are made to the good after the first date of sale, 
these alterations will not restart the clock.  In the Unit Systems Case,106 the 
manufacturer of a piping system for air conditioners claimed a date of first sale 
in August of 1997, some five years after its original good first made it to the 
market.107  The court held that the date of first sale for these revised goods was 
August of 1997, but the date of the first sale of the original good was March of 
1992.108  As such, not only did it predate the effectiveness date of the 
amendments to the UCPA, it also far exceeded the three years of protection 
afforded by the statute.109 
Therefore, three years from the first sale of the configuration is to be 
interpreted very broadly.  The clock will commence immediately upon the 
public becoming exposed to the configuration in any form, be it in specific 
sales, marketing or other brochures and pamphlets, or through any kind of 
 
 98. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 118. 
 99. Id. at 121. 
 100. Id. 
 101. K.K. J. Seven v. K.K. Best Co., 26 MUTAIZAISAN HANREISHU 1323, 1325 (Kobe D. Ct., 
Dec. 8, 1994). 
 102. Id. at 1326. 
 103. Id. at 1330. 
 104. Id. at 1326. 
 105. Id. at 1330. 
 106. Kyoritsu Air Tech., K.K. v. Air Conditioning Star, K.K., 1718 HANREI JIHO 120 (Tokyo 
High Ct., Feb. 17, 2000). 
 107. Id. at 121–22. 
 108. Id. at 126. 
 109. Id. at 129. 
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advertising.  It would be a rather diligent plaintiff that could take full 
advantage of the full three-year period of protection. 
C. Slavish Imitation (moho) 
Another element of this cause of action is that a configuration actually is 
imitated or copied.  The Japanese use a particular word for copy or imitate: 
moho.  It means more than just “copied;” it means “slavish imitation.”110  
Slavish imitation means using an exact replica of the configuration or an 
important portion of that configuration.111  It does not merely mean “copied.” 
Determining if a configuration was slavishly imitated is a factually 
intensive inquiry.  There must be a subjective as well as an objective intent to 
slavishly imitate.112  First, there must be objective facts in the record to show 
that the defendant did in fact slavishly imitate the plaintiff’s configuration.  
This is satisfied if the slavish imitation is done completely (doitsu) or 
substantially (jisshitsuteki).113  Therefore, even if the color of the defendant’s 
product is slightly different, or the dimensions are not precisely the same, so 
long as the defendant’s configuration is substantially the same as the 
plaintiff’s, it will be deemed a slavish imitation.114 
This is rather paradoxical.  On one hand, the meaning of “moho” is to 
slavishly imitate.  On the other hand, a substantially similar copy will be 
deemed to be a slavish imitation.  This may be the definition of an oxymoron.  
It is technically not possible that something is a substantially similar slavishly 
imitated object.  It is either slavishly imitated or it is not.  There should be no 
substantial similarity with which to be concerned.  If that were supposed to be 
the test, the Japanese Diet would have presumptively used a term other than 
“moho.”  They could have used a host of other terms that would allow for a 
“substantial” similarity to be the test of slavish imitation, but clearly they did 
not.  It is equally clear that courts and commentators have grafted the notion of 
substantial similarity of Dead Copies onto the Dead Copy Statute. 
This ability to call substantial similar product configurations “slavish 
imitations” is yet another manner in which the Dead Copy Statute might be 
abused to stifle legitimate competition. 
The Diet used the word “moho” for a reason.  They felt that entities needed 
a head start.  They felt that providing this head start, would motivate entities to 
 
 110. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 126. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; see also, K.K. K. & T. v. Yasutake, 1613 HANREI JIHO 134 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 7, 
1997). 
 114. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 126. 
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innovate.  By protecting the configurations of entities for three years, it was 
felt that these entities would recognize a significant incentive to innovate.115 
At the same time, a balance had to be struck.  If the right was too narrow, it 
would chill the very innovation it was intended to promote.116  If the right was 
too broad, competition would become difficult and entities would simply not 
enter the game.  This dilemma was the reason for using the word “moho” in the 
first place.  There are multiple other words that could have been used.  In 
Trademark Law, when referring to the concept of “similarity”, the Japanese 
Diet uses the term “ruiji.”  In Copyright Law, the Diet chose the term “doitsu.”  
In Design Law, they chose the term “ruiji.”117  It is only in the context of the 
Dead Copy Statute that the Diet elected to use the term “moho.”  Presumably, 
the choice is of some significance.  That is, “moho” was supposed to have a 
distinctive meaning for the Dead Copy Statute.  To say that a configuration 
that is substantially similar to another satisfies the expectations of using the 
term “moho” is disingenuous at best. 
One way or another, there also needs to be subjective evidence that the 
defendant intended to slavishly imitate the plaintiff’s configuration.  If the 
defendant’s configuration is the result of the actual expenditure of time, 
money, and actual innovation, it cannot be slavish imitation even if the result is 
a configuration that is the same or substantially the same as the plaintiff’s.118  
 
 115. See TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301. 
 116. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 127. 
 117. But cf., id. at 129–30 (noting that Takada says “doitsu” and “ruji” are the same thing). 
 118. K.K. Genyo v. Miyuki Technologies Yugen Kaisha, 1644 HANREI JIHO 153 (Tokyo 
High Ct., Feb. 26, 1998) (finding that defendant’s key chain that was shaped as a very similar 
dragon carrying a sword not did not infringe because it was nearly twice the size of the 
plaintiff’s); see also K.K. Simree v. K.K. Belluna, 1822 HANREI JIHO 138 (Tokyo D. Ct., Nov. 
27, 2002) (regarding the configuration of women’s clothing); K.K. Western Arms v. K.K. Anges 
Seiki Hanbai, 1815 HANREI JIHO 123 (Tokyo High Ct., Jan. 31, 2002) (stating that the 
configuration of air guns is protected); Yubisha Sangyo, K.K. v. Leather Products, K.K., 1770 
HANREI JIHO 136 (Tokyo High Ct., Sept. 26, 2001) (finding a small women’s shoulder bag to be 
a valid product configuration and infringed); Citizen Watch, K.K. v. Yugen Kaisha Timely Bass, 
1692 HANREI JIHO 129, 132 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 29, 1999) (finding that a watch face was 
infringed where time was told by two rotating concentric discs rather than by a digital display or 
hands). 
  For examples of cases where the Dead Copy Statute was determined to not be infringed, 
see K.K. Basheen v. Eiko Metals, K.K., 1826 HANREI JIHO 132 (Osaka D. Ct., Apr. 9, 2003) 
(finding that the configuration of defendant’s packaging and a hair brush were one and the same 
and therefore appropriate subject matter for UCPA 2-1-3, but finding no infringement); K.K. I-
Face v. Yugen Kaisha Bit Gang, 1828 HANREI JIHO 121 (Tokyo D. Ct., Jan. 28, 2003) (denying 
the protection of schedule managing software); Yugen Gaisha Harada Golf v. Citizen Mfg., K.K., 
1677 HANREI JIHO 127 (Tokyo D. Ct., Jan. 28, 1999) (finding that a golf bag was not infringed); 
K.K. Sunlemon v. K.K. Oike, 1610 HANREI JIHO 112 (Tokyo D. Ct., June 27, 1997) (finding that 
fasteners shaped like animals were not infringed); J.T. Hawkins, Ltd. v. Osaka Chem. Indus., 
K.K., 28 MUTAIZISAN HANREISHU 140 (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 29, 1996) (finding that explanation 
attached to a sandal was not imitated). 
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In other words, as another exception, the Dead Copy Statute recognizes 
independent creation as an affirmative defense.119  However, if the 
configurations are nearly identical, it will be presumed that it would be 
extremely unlikely that the development was truly independent, and therefore, 
it may be subject to the provisions of the Dead Copy Statute.120 
One of the most cited cases regarding “moho” is the Dragon Sword 
Case.121  In the words of the Tokyo High Court: 
“Imitation” [moho] for purposes of Article 2-1-3 of the Unfair Competition 
Prevention Act means producing and offering for sale products whose 
configuration is identical or substantially identical to another’s.  Objectively, 
this means that when viewing the products produced by another, one would 
have to say that the products are the same or substantially the same.  
Subjectively, this means that [the infringer] knows it is the product 
configuration of another and that the product is objectively recognized as the 
same or substantially the same as that of another.122 
That is, subjectively and objectively, the configurations must be identical.  
Yet, the court provides some leniency when it finds that a “substantially” 
identical configuration infringes just the same as an exact imitation. 
In the Dragon Sword Case, the High Court reversed the lower court’s 
finding of infringement.123  The product at issue was a key chain that consisted 
of a sword with a dragon wrapped around it.124  The defendant’s dragon was 
wrapped more times around the sword and was nearly twice the dimensions of 
the plaintiff’s.125  The plaintiff’s key chain had a jewel embedded in what 
would be the handle of the sword.126  The High Court found that these 
differences made the defendant’s key chain not “substantially” identical to the 
plaintiff’s key chain.127  The key chains are represented below.  Obviously, 
they are quite similar.  It appears that Japanese courts are very careful when 
applying the Dead Copy Statute.  Perhaps they are aware of the economic 
destructive capacity of the Dead Copy Statute. 
 
 
  By looking at this litany of cases, it is reasonable to conclude that the Dead Copy Statute 
has not been a significant aspect to Japanese intellectual property protection because there are no 
cases that address truly remarkable innovations.  This does not mean that the potential for such 
cases is not there, just that the potential has yet to be realized. 
 119. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 127, 129. 
 120. Id. at 129. As in copyright law, if access is proven, copying might be presumed.  Id. 
 121. K.K. Genyo v. Miyuki Technologies Yugen Kaisha, 1644 HANREI JIHO 153 (Tokyo 
High Ct., Feb. 26, 1998). 
 122. Id. at 155 (translated by author). 
 123. Id. at 154. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 154–55. 
 126. K.K. Genyo, 1644 HANREI JIHO at 155. 
 127. Id. 
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 Plaintiff’s Configuration Defendant’s Configuration 
 
D. Configuration Commonly Used with Such Goods 
A “configuration commonly used with such goods” is viewed as an 
exception to the provisions of the Dead Copy Statute.128  That is, when a 
configuration consists of a good that is commonly used by others in association 
with the sale of the product at hand, such a configuration will not be protected 
under the Dead Copy Statute.129  There are two perceived types of exceptions 
under this provision.  The first is that the configuration is trite or commonplace 
(arifureta).130  The other is that the configuration is functional (kinoteki).131 
In a case that is sure to drastically narrow the definition of a “configuration 
commonly used with such goods” and drastically expand the reach of the Dead 
Copy Statute, the Intellectual Property High Court132 found the following 
 
 128. See K.K. K. & T. v. Yasutake, 1613 HANREI JIHO 134 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 7 1997). 
 129. See KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 71. 
 130. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 123. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Although it has a circuitous history, the Intellectual Property High Court was established 
on April 1, 2005.  See Intellectual Property High Court: History, http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/ 
aboutus/history.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).  It is charged with hearing appeals of only 
intellectual property law cases that arise out of one of the four Tokyo District Courts or two 
Osaka District Courts that specialize in intellectual property law cases.  See id.  What amounts to 
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configuration, in the form of a shirt worn by young women, to be not 
functional, not trite, and therefore protectable.133 
 
 Plaintiff’s Shirt Defendant’s Shirt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The defendant claimed that the shirt was of an inevitable design given that 
it was a sleeveless top and that it was merely a combination of two different 
designs that were on the market long before the plaintiff began selling shirts.134  
The court stated that even though this design might be a combination of other 
designs, “it cannot be said that the plaintiff’s configuration lacks 
personality.”135 
Additionally, the defendant argued that the configuration in question was 
“trite.”136  In response to this argument, the court held: 
Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA is a provision aimed at preventing the imitation of a 
firstcomer’s contribution [kaihatsu rieki].  As such, the product configuration 
 
“intellectual property” is determined by the statute under which rights are claimed in any given 
case.  See Intellectual Property High Court: Jurisdiction, http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/eng/aboutus/ 
jurisdiction.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).  If rights are claimed under any one of the 
intellectual property law statutes, the case is initially heard by one of the specialized district 
courts, then the specialized high court, and finally the Supreme Court.  See id.  For a fuller 
treatment of the history of these courts by the Japanese Patent Office in English, see id.  See also 
John Kakinuki & Ryota Charles Goto, Getting Technical—Japan’s New Intellectual Property 
High Court, 165 PATENT WORLD 15 (2004). 
 133. K.K. Young Fashion Research Center v. K.K. Vent International (Intellectual Prop. High 
Ct., Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/chizai.nsf/Listview01/ 
B3DD56C8F981C672492570D00005FA55/?OpenDocument (translated by author).  The court 
held in favor of the original plaintiff, but awarded only 334,750 yen in damages, including 
100,000 yen in attorney’s fees (approximately $2,900).  See id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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protected thereunder refers to the overall product [shohinzentai] and does not 
require that the configuration be novel [dokusokuteki].  Therefore, judging this 
configuration considering the totality of the configuration instead of on a 
piecemeal basis as the defendant argues for, it cannot be said that the 
configuration is trite.137 
Trite or not, it seems that the shirt in question here is completely 
functional.  Functionality, for these purposes, is defined as “a configuration 
chosen to inevitably or naturally realize the benefit or utility of the product.”138  
However, in reasoning that might be deemed trite, the court found that the 
configuration at issue here (the shape of a girl’s shirt) is not the common shape 
of this good as commonly used in this industry.139  In other words, it was 
possible for the defendant to compete fairly without adopting an exact copy of 
the plaintiff’s design, and therefore, the design was not functional.140  That is, 
where the configuration is needed to compete, the configuration is considered 
functional.141  There is no room in Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA to deny 
protection of a configuration based on its normative142 functionality, only its 
competitive143 functionality. 
Similarly in a case regarding the NuBra,144 the plaintiff claimed that the 
defendant had copied the shape of its bras.145  The MAGICUPS, SWIVELIFT, 
STAYKUPS, CLEARLY NATURAL and EXTREME PLUNGE were all 
allegedly copied by the defendant.146  The court found no copying, but did hold 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 123. 
 139. K.K. Young Fashion Research Center v. K.K. Vent International, available at 
http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/chizai.nsf/Listview01/B3DD56C8F981C672492570D00005FA5
5/?OpenDocument (Intellectual Prop. High Ct., Dec. 5, 2005) (translated by author). 
 140. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 123. 
 141. K.K. Young Fashion Research Center (Dec. 5, 2005). 
 142. For a United States case, see In re Morton-Norwich Prod., Inc., a case before the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board regarding the appropriateness of registering the Fantastic 
bottle configuration.  671 F.2d 1332, 1340 (C.C.P.A 1982).  The court held that competitive need 
is only one element in the larger question of utility.  Id. 
 143. It seems as if this would closely approximate the standard used today in the United 
States.  See Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (stating that the primary 
test for determining whether a product feature is functional is whether the feature is “essential to 
the use or purpose of the device or [whether] it affects the cost or quality of the device.”); see also 
Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, Traffix, Moseley and Dastar—
The Supreme Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 237, 258 
(2005). 
 144. Gold Flag, K.K. v. K.K. Peach John, 1927 HANREI JIHO 134 (Osaka D. Ct., Sept. 8, 
2005). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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that even though the bras at issue were described in the Patent Communique,147 
this alone was insufficient to render them a Configuration Commonly Used 
with Such Goods.148  The court held that even though the bras were described 
in various Patent Communiques, the point of Article 2-1-3 of the UCPA is to 
prevent free-riding by second-comers on the innovations of the firstcomer.149  
Therefore, the judgment regarding copying must be based on tangible 
products.150  Mere descriptions of the products in the Patent Communique are 
insufficient.151  For the above reasons, the bras at issue were not 
“configurations commonly used with such goods.”152 
Of course, it is important to recognize that for purposes of “first sale,” the 
mere publication of the configuration in a pamphlet or sales brochure is 
enough to start the clock running on the three-year period of protection.153  
However, the court apparently held that these types of publications would not 
be sufficiently tangible products with which comparisons could be made.154  
Therefore, publications might be used to start the three-year clock running.155  
Publications could not be used as a basis for comparison to determine if the 
configuration is either copied or if it would fit into the exceptions and not be 
protectable at all.156 
In the end, this exception is satisfied and the Dead Copy Statute will not 
apply if, when compared to goods of the same type, there is nothing distinctive 
about the configuration and it only represents the form or function of the 
configuration.157  
E. Goods (shohin) 
One might think that the word “goods” (shohin) would not require a 
specific definition.  However, as it turns out, a definition is primarily necessary 
to differentiate “goods” from “services” (yakueki), because the Dead Copy 
 
 147. A Patent Communique is an official publication of the Japanese Patent Office regarding 
pending and published patent applications, available at http://www.jiii.or.jp/koho/ (translated by 
author). 
 148. Gold Flag, K.K., 1927 HANREI JIHO 134. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See supra Part V.B. 
 154. Gold Flag, K.K., 1927 HANREI JIHO 134. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See K.K. Young Fashion Research Center v. K.K. Vent International (Intellectual Prop. 
High Ct., Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/chizai.nsf/Listview01/ 
B3DD56C8F981C672492570D00005FA55/?OpenDocument (translated by author). 
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Statute applies to goods, but not to services.158  Therefore, a “good” is defined 
as a chattel that is put in the stream of commerce for the purpose of making a 
commercial sale.159  This means that the good must be a three dimensional 
product: abstract industrial property rights are not included.160  This fact did 
not stop the Intellectual Property High Court from very recently finding the 
headlines of newspaper articles to be “goods” for purposes of the UCPA and 
granting relief based on the Civil Code.161 
However, it is now rather clear that the Dead Copy Statute will not apply 
to pure databases.162  This conclusion is not entirely expected.  Some 
commentators have argued that there is room for the Dead Copy Statute to 
protect things such as databases163 or that the Dead Copy Statute should protect 
databases when they are marketed on a CD or other tangible form.164  This 
amounts to a significant departure from the original intent of the Dead Copy 
Statute.  The original intent of the Dead Copy Statute was to provide a period 
of protection so that those people considering Design Law protection could be 
adequately protected in the market while their design application is pending.165  
This is why the Dead Copy Statute only applies to goods and not services and 
why a three-year window of protection was needed (originally it took up to 
three years to obtain a Design Law registration).166  As none of these 
objectives are satisfied by extending Dead Copy protection to databases, it 
would be unreasonable for such an extension to take place.  Therefore, “good” 
 
 158. KANEI ET AL., supra note 76, at 60 (translated by author); see also TAMURA, supra note 
63, at 303 n.1; Charles R. McManis, Database Protection in the Digital Information Age, 7 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 7, 20–21 (2001).  But see Tsubasa System, K.K. v. K.K. System 
Japan, 1774 HANREI JIHO 132 (Tokyo D. Ct., May 25, 2001) (translated by author) (finding that 
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s database regarding automobiles was a tort, “an unlawful 
infringement of plaintiff’s legally protected business operations,” under Article 709 of the Civil 
Code and ordering defendant to pay $8 million in damages). 
 159. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 55 (translated by author).  Regarding the definition of 
“goods” for purposes of Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA, a provision closely related to the Dead Copy 
Statute, see K.K. Mochisawa v. Yamanochi, 1505 HANREI JIHO 136 (Tokyo High Ct., Dec. 24, 
1993); Ito v. K.K. Kyobashi Iwada Bokei, 1057 HANREI JIHO 43 (Tokyo High Ct., Apr. 28, 
1982). 
 160. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 55. 
 161. Yomiuri Newspaper v. Digital Alliance (Intellectual Prop. High Ct., Oct. 6, 2005) 
(relying, however, on Article 709 of the Civil Code to support an injunction and damages), 
available at http://legal.lexisnexis.jp/jp/lngateway.dll?f=templates&fn=defaultHome_JP.htm& 
vid=Japan:10.1048/Enu. 
 162. That is, databases that lack originality. 
 163. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 117. 
 164. McManis, supra note 158, at 21. 
 165. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 166. This, at least, is the common wisdom.  At least since 2002, the pendency period for 
Design Law applications has been 8 months.  See JPO Annual Report 2005, available at 
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou_e/toushin_e/kenkyukai_e/pdf/ar2005/ar2005_part05.pdf. 
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as used in the Dead Copy Statute should mean three-dimensional goods or 
two-dimensional designs for actual products. 
F. Configuration of Another Person 
The words “competition” (kyoso) and “confusion” (kondo) are 
conspicuously absent from the Dead Copy Statute.  In fact, even the word 
“intent” (ito) is nowhere to be found in the Dead Copy Statute.167  This would 
imply that they are irrelevant.   
In other portions of the UCPA, such as Articles 2-1-1 and 2-1-2, which 
immediately precede the Dead Copy Statute, these terms are included (except 
for “intent”).  Since they are absent from the Dead Copy Statute, normal 
statutory construction would also imply that they are irrelevant—that the Dead 
Copy Statute could be applied to competitors or non-competitors equally, 
irregardless of an intent to imitate or deceive. 
Although competition is presumed to be a requisite element of each 
provision in the UCPA,168 the only literal intimation that exists in the language 
of the Dead Copy Statute itself is the use of the term “tanin no” (another 
person’s) configuration.169  Accordingly, the literal language of the Dead Copy 
Statute would permit its use against non-competitors.  However, because the 
statute refers to the configuration “of another person,” it impliedly relates only 
to competitors.170  Of course, this taxes the imagination a bit.  One can easily 
envision “another person” with whom there is no competition.  However, if 
one slavishly imitates the product of another, then presumably the target 
market for that product would be the same or similar to that of the original 
product.  This, however, is not expressly stated and is only presumed by the 
Diet. 
Regardless of the clear statutory omission, “another person” has been 
limited by Japanese courts to mean “the person who develops a product, 
commercializes it, and places it in the stream of commerce.”171  The imitator 
would presumably be in competition with the original, thus necessitating the 
imitation. 
The requirement of competition should be clearly stated in the statute.  The 
statute should be further amended to make it clear that the Dead Copy Statute 
should only apply in competitive situations.  Failing to limit the Dead Copy 
 
 167. However, as noted in the material regarding imitation, intent is a judicially created 
requirement.  See TAMURA, supra note 63, at 301. 
 168. YAMAMOTO, supra note 76, at 55. 
 169. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 2-1-3, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Kono, K.K. v. Teihara, 1760 HANREI JIHO 138 (Tokyo D. Ct., Aug. 31, 2001) (translated 
by author); see also Basheen, K.K. v. Eko Metal, K.K., 1826 HANREI JIHO 132 (Osaka D. Ct., 
Apr. 9, 2002). 
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Statute to truly competitive situations potentially broadens the statute far 
beyond what was originally intended.  If a three-year window is needed to give 
entities a leg up in the marketplace or a head start over their competition, then 
there seems to be a specific need to make certain that the parties are in 
competition in the first place.  If there is no competition, one of the basic 
foundations of the Dead Copy Statute is not met and therefore no cause of 
action should arise. 
VI.  ANOTHER BITE OUT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 
It is now pretty well established that trademark or trademark-like 
monopolies are not positive things for an economy.172  The Dead Copy Statute 
establishes an unnatural, statutory monopoly for a period of three years.173  We 
generally believe that all of intellectual property is an artificial monopoly.174  If 
intellectual property assets were priced at marginal cost, return on investment 
would never be realized because the cost of creation is so high.175  Therefore, 
governments create artificial monopolies to encourage innovation.176  That is, 
the Dead Copy Statute will result in a monopoly control over each individual 
configuration, causing demand for that configuration to drop as prices for that 
configuration rise.177  Free competition is the major loser with the Dead Copy 
Statute. 
The Dead Copy Statute appears in the UCPA, but it really acts entirely as a 
sui generis law because it has no association with appellations of source or 
distinctiveness of any kind and it cannot be said to act like anything related to 
the Trademark Law,178 Unfair Competition Law,179 or intellectual property law 
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 173. UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 19-5, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005). 
 174. Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 39 (2005). 
 175. Mark Klock, Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REV. 317, 368–
69 (2002). 
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 177. Lunney, supra note 28, at 367–68. 
 178. See Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, art. 1 (“By protecting trademarks, this law 
aims to maintain the goodwill of the businesses of trademark users and thereby to contribute to 
the growth and development of business and to protect the interest of the consumer.”).  Granting 
rights to prevent the slavish imitation of configuration that has no source denoting function does 
not meet this explicit objective of the Trademark Law.  See KENNETH L. PORT, JAPANESE 
TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE 26 (1998). 
 179. See UCPA, Law No. 47 of 1993, art. 1, translated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 6895–
96 (2005) (“The objective of this law is to contribute to the robust development of the Japanese 
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in general.180  As competition is only a presumed element of the cause of 
action, it cannot be said that it is directly related to “unfair” competition either.  
As such, it is best conceptualized as a stand alone, sui generis law. 
This cannot be good for the Japanese economy.  Removing all product 
design from the marketplace of ideas for three years after the initial sale of that 
article will lead to less competition and unnatural higher prices.  At a time 
when the Japanese economy is fragile at best,181 this cannot have overall 
positive results for the Japanese economy. 
It is axiomatic in intellectual property law that as monopoly or monopoly-
like rights expand, rents go up and competition goes down.182  The Japanese 
see this as an effective trade-off to encourage innovation.  They see it as a gap-
filler so that those creators of works that will ultimately be protected by the 
Design Law can be protected while their Design Law application is pending. 
However, there is a flaw in the Japanese rationale for the Dead Copy 
Statute.  For a period of three years, the first user of a configuration is granted 
the right to charge monopoly rents regarding that configuration.  During this 
monopoly period, an intelligent or sophisticated user will take advantage of 
that three-year period to add a source denoting function to the configuration.183  
Once that source denoting function is added to the trade dress, it will become 
 
stream of commerce with no explicit requirement that there be any competition and with no 
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 183. Technically, because use is not required for a trademark registration in Japan, one could 
even file the trademark application prior to a mark having a source denoting function; however, 
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appropriate subject matter for a regular trademark registration.184  Once 
registered, that first user of the configuration, now the owner of a broad 
Japanese trademark registration, will have the ability to exclude all others from 
using that configuration on confusingly similar goods (not just slavishly 
imitated goods) for as long as that first user maintains the registration.185  
Under the Japanese regime, one can obtain rights in classifications of goods 
where no use is made.186  Although any such registration is subject to 
cancellation if it is not used for a period of three years,187 it is quite common 
for Japanese competitors to broadly register under a variety of classifications 
where no use is had or is expected so that the unsuspecting second comer 
becomes technically liable for infringing the very mark it had been using.  This 
could very well be in perpetuity.188 
Additionally, a Japanese trademark registration itself is far stronger and 
much less susceptible to challenge than a registration in the United States.189  
Therefore, this trademark registration is a very broad property right.190  That is, 
what begins as an innocent, three-year head start (to encourage innovation of 
configurations and to allow for configurations to be used and not kept secret 
while the Design Law application is pending) can easily transform into a broad 
monopoly of indefinite duration.  This cannot be a positive thing for the fragile 
Japanese economy. 
 
 184. Trademark Law, Law No. 68 of 1996, arts. 2-1, 3, 4.  The Japanese actually refer to trade 
dress registrations as “ritai shohyo” or three dimensional marks.  The Japanese Patent Office 
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 189. PORT, supra note 178, at 112. 
 190. See id. at 75–79 (reviewing cases regarding the protection of three dimensional 
trademarks under Article 2-1-1 of the UCPA and concluding that “the possibilities for protection 
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More importantly, the Trademark Law was amended, effective April 1, 
1997.191  With this amendment, for the first time, configurations were 
recognized as possible trademarks.  For the first time, three-dimensional trade 
dress became appropriate subject matter for registration as a trademark.  Even 
if the justification was accurate for the Dead Copy Statute in 1993 (and I argue 
that it was not), it is, to be sure, no longer accurate post-April 1, 1997.  Today, 
product configuration is protectable as a trademark, registrable as a trademark, 
and can be protected to the full extent of trademark law.192 
The Dead Copy Statute was drafted in 1993, some three years before the 
amendments to the Trademark Law were drafted.193  At that time, product 
configurations were only protected if they had become well-known “Good[s] 
or other Appellation[s]” under the old Unfair Competition Prevention Act.194  
If they failed to qualify as well-known, there was no protection. 
Between 1993 and 1997, the Dead Copy Statute was the only means by 
which one might protect product configuration that was not a well-known 
appellation of source.  Today, one merely needs to register that configuration 
as a trademark and take full advantage of the Trademark Law.  There is really 
no longer any need for the Dead Copy Statute and it ought to be repealed. 
VII.  THE NEW MORAL RIGHT 
The Dead Copy Statute in Japan operates like moral rights under the Civil 
Law System.  Many Civil Law countries protect moral rights.195  Moral rights 
generally include the right of attribution, the right of integrity, and the right of 
withdrawal.196  These rights are usually inalienable197 and are usually reserved 
for the individual,198 not the corporation.199  In Japan, however, the notion that 
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moral rights are somehow reserved for individuals seems to go 
unrecognized.200  The hurdle of maintaining moral rights as personal rights has 
been long crossed.  As such, the notion of creating rights that look and feel like 
moral rights and where a corporation is the principle benefactor is not a 
conceptually difficult task.  Because moral rights are already exercised by 
corporations, creating one more right for the benefit of corporations is not a 
hard stretch to make. 
Therefore, the best way to understand the Dead Copy Statute in Japan is to 
perceive of it as a moral right that corporations enjoy.  As it is not one of the 
generally enumerated moral rights, to me, this is a “new moral right.”  To 
pretend this has to do with unfair competition is misleading, to say the least. 
The Dead Copy Statute operates like a moral right because it seems to 
protect the personality of the corporation.  The corporation mingles itself with 
the product configuration and therefore, on a natural rights sort of orientation, 
is protected regardless of any source denoting capacity of the configuration.  
That is, the corporate “self”201 is extended to include any and all configurations 
which the corporation is the first to put into the stream of commerce (and 
which are not functional, etc.). 
Therefore, the Dead Copy Statute creates a moral right that is capable of 
being exercised by the corporate owner of the relevant configuration.  This 
may give other benefits to the corporation (such as a head start in creating 
trademark protection), but that is all ancillary to the mere fact of the protection 
of the configuration.  The Japanese believe that the personality of the 
corporation, in the form of the configuration, must be protected to encourage 
innovation.  Although this is the justification that is given, it is entirely 
unpersuasive.  A more persuasive argument is that the personality of the 
corporation needs to be protected as a natural right and the best way to 
accomplish this is by protecting manifestations of the corporate self in the form 
of the configurations it places into the stream of commerce. 
CONCLUSION 
The Japanese Dead Copy Statute goes too far.  It attempts to protect the 
developers of product configuration for three years from the date of first sale, 
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but because there is no requirement that the configuration be distinctive, that 
registration be had, that notice be given, or that confusion be proved, it 
operates as a sui generis monopoly on product configurations.  The Japanese 
claim that the Dead Copy Statute is somehow justified or necessary because of 
German, American, and even international law.  However, these claims are 
spurious because there is no such broad requirement in any of these enacted 
laws.  Therefore, the claim that the Dead Copy Statute is necessary for 
harmonization is also erroneous.  In fact, the mere existence of the Dead Copy 
Statute makes harmonization very difficult. 
Dead Copy protection in the United States would be unconstitutional.  It 
goes against the most basic concepts of free and open competition.  It flies in 
the face of the basic American notion that anything not protected by copyright, 
patent, or trademark is free for all to copy. 
There is a fundamental difference between the United States and Japan 
(and perhaps other countries) in the manner in which each country 
conceptualizes the need to protect the developer of some configuration in order 
to encourage them to produce more.  In the United States, we call this a patent; 
in Japan, they call it a monopoly. 
The Dead Copy Statute is justified by the Japanese on the ground that it 
improves innovation.  However, it has been shown that the nature of the 
configurations protected are not innovative, creative, or even all that 
interesting.  If innovation were being encouraged by the Dead Copy Statute, 
one would expect the configurations to represent that.  In fact, the Dead Copy 
Statute is merely being used as another method to further the competitive goals 
of individual corporations. 
The only acceptable explanation of the Dead Copy Statute is that it 
operates as a personal right, much like the moral right in Civil Law legal 
systems.  Of course, the huge distinction is that this personal right is also 
available to corporations and in every society other than Japan, moral rights are 
enjoyed only by individuals, not corporations.  Strict liability attaches to 
violations of this right just like strict liability applies to violations of the moral 
right.  As the Dead Copy Statute is inconsistent with economic realities and the 
Trademark Law now provides protection for product configurations, the Dead 
Copy Statute ought to be repealed. 
 
